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Abstract 
 In this paper we challenge the widespread notion that replacement level 
fertility is the most desirable level of fertility both for countries currently above and 
below this level. We first discuss possible alternative criteria for choosing one fertility 
level over another. Dismissing for the time being the two extreme criteria of ever 
increasing national strength (which would imply unlimited population growth) and 
preservation of the environment (which would see human numbers converge to 
zero), we focus on age dependency as the sole criterion. But we do so by relaxing 
the strong assumption that all individuals of a given age are equal in terms of their 
economic contribution to society and introduce education as probably the most 
relevant observable source of population heterogeneity. Our criterion variable is the 
education weighted support ratio and we perform thousands of alternative 
simulations for different constant levels of fertility starting from empirically given 
populations. If education is assumed to present a cost at young age and results in 
higher productivity during working age then for most countries the optimal long-term 
total fertility rate turns out to be well below replacement level. 
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Optimal Fertility 
Erich Striessnig and Wolfgang Lutz 
1  Introduction 
Assume for the moment that fertility is a policy variable and we can choose among 
different hypothetical future pathways. Which average number of children should we 
be promoting as a social norm in the best interest of society? Demographers have so 
far been quite reluctant to even hint at possible answers to this rather normative 
question, whereas the factual trends in the levels of fertility, as well as their 
projection into the future have received widespread attention. If at all, then normative 
judgments are voiced indirectly, for example, from scientists expressing their 
concern about high-fertility in some contexts and possible ‘low-fertility traps’ in 
others. Yet, what enables them to judge and describe such scenarios as possible 
catastrophes? 
The goal of our paper is to find possible criteria to enable us to choose one 
fertility future over the others. How is it even possible to identify one pathway that 
would be preferable compared to all others? And what could valid criteria for 
considering one trend as being more desirable than another look like? This is in 
short the normative analysis that is conducted in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the 
model and our base-line assumptions upon which the results – presented in 
Section4 – are based. Section 5 consists of detailed sensitivity analysis before a final 
discussion revisits – and challenges – the theme developed in many previous 
discussions of the disastrous long-term consequences of low fertility. It delivers a 
potentially unexpected message to governments on what should be the goal of their 
policies in the context of population ageing and shrinking. 
2  Criteria of Optimality 
When asked what a desirable fertility level for populations in Europe might be, most 
politicians, journalists and even social scientists would say that demographers 
intimate it is around two children per woman – a level called ‘replacement level 
fertility’. The reasons stated in support of this level of fertility (which in most 
European countries is higher than the one currently reported) usually refer to 
maintaining the size of the labor force and stabilizing the old-age dependency ratio. 
But a closer look at the demographic models that underlie this reasoning reveals that 
this supposedly precise level of 2.1 (actually more like 2.06 under low mortality 
conditions) is only derived from a highly stylized theoretical model of stable 
population. It has little to do with maintaining the size of the labor force in 
contemporary real European societies. These have an age structure which is highly 
irregular due to past fluctuations in fertility and net migration. 
Even in the hypothetical absence of migration, in countries with a high share 
of young people (positive momentum of population growth) fertility should be well 
below replacement level if the goal is to maintain the absolute size of the working 
age population. Conversely, in countries with relatively few younger people (i.e., that 
have already entered a phase of negative momentum) fertility should be significantly 
above replacement level if the goal is to maintain the working-age population.  
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Lutz et al. (2003) showed that Europe’s population entered a phase of negative 
momentum around the year 2000. Hence in this context of real European 
populations and their empirically given age structures, a reference to replacement 
level fertility makes little sense in terms of the stated goal of maintaining the labor 
force in its current size. 
Another line of argumentation in favor of two surviving children per woman 
refers to individual preferences and a supposedly ‘natural’ desire for a man and a 
woman to have two children together to replace themselves and hence continue 
living in their children. Lutz and Scherbov (2008) argued that it is worth distinguishing 
between population level replacement and individual level replacement. They stress 
that at the individual level it is sufficient to have one child (under low child mortality 
conditions) if the primary goal is to pass on one’s genes and continue to live on in 
the next generation. In the absence of cloning it takes a partner of the opposite sex 
to produce this one offspring. As such, the child is made up of only half of each 
parent’s genes. Yet having two or three children does not make the offspring more 
similar to the parent. It would of course spread his/her genes more widely, but this is 
a very different goal from replacement and if this were the goal then, of course, one 
should have as many children as possible. There would be no reason to stop at two. 
There may be other individual level reasons for having a second child, such as 
providing the first child with a sibling, but again this is not related to the question of 
replacement. We only mention this important distinction between societal and 
individual level replacement in order to make sure that the following discussion of 
optimal fertility at the societal level is not confounded with that of personal optimal 
fertility at the level of individuals and couples. Seen from the individual perspective it 
may be optimal to minimize the difference between desired and actual family size; 
however, the resulting aggregate level of fertility may not be ‘optimal’ for society. 
When thinking about what would be the ‘optimal’ level of fertility in the longer 
run for any given population, one must first think clearly about the criteria for making 
such judgments. In the context of current European populations, most of the concern 
in the discussion of demographic trends centers on the economic and social security 
consequences of population ageing. In this context the criteria for optimality are to 
minimize the projected increases in the old-age dependency burden and, more 
generally, to maximize the economic well-being of the average citizen in the 
population studied. But in times of major concerns about global climate change, the 
possible impacts of different demographic trajectories on future paths of greenhouse 
gas emissions and on a future generation’s ability to cope with the expected negative 
consequences of climate change must be taken into consideration, at least 
conceptually. With respect to this environmental dimension, there is generally little 
doubt that fewer people would be better. Still, the major challenge is how to quantify 
this effect and how to weigh it against the costs and benefits of the ageing 
dimension. 
There still may be a third, quite powerful criterion for judging the desirability of 
alternative longer-term fertility trends and levels. We may label this criterion ‘national 
identity,’ reflecting a population’s fears of having a smaller population in relation to its 
rivals. Under such a view population growth, even if not considered economically 
advantageous may still seem desirable. This can operate at both inter-state and 
intra-state levels and may explain the prevalence of high birth rates under conditions 
of ethnic rivalry such as between Palestinians and Jews in Israel, despite the 
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relatively high levels of socio-economic development in both communities (Fargues 
2000). 
While at some point these non-economic criteria must also be taken into 
consideration – not so much because of their stringency but because they exert a 
significant influence in real world discussions –in the following we focus solely on the 
economic aspects associated with the changing age structure of the population while 
explicitly taking education into account. 
3 The Model 
In 2004, Lutz, Sanderson and O’Neill published their ‘Population Balance’ Model 
which directly addressed the question of optimal fertility (Lutz et al. 2004). The 
welfare indicator that was used to assess ‘optimality’ was sensitive to age- and 
education-specific productivity, cost of pension and cost of education. They asked 
whether the per capita welfare decline caused by rising dependency ratios could be 
counterbalanced by the improved education of the smaller young cohorts. This might 
increase their productivity, offsetting the costs of rising dependency ratios. At the 
same time, smaller young cohorts cost less at a given level of education expenditure 
per child. 
The effects of alternative levels of education on welfare were evaluated in the 
context of different fertility scenarios. Each steady-state level of fertility produces a 
distinct age structure which becomes stable in the long run. The results are shown in 
Figure 1. They clearly indicate that in the case of low education, the optimum is very 
broad – meaning that the welfare indicator is not very responsive to changes in 
fertility – and peaks around two children. In the context of higher education levels, 
however, the optimum moves to the left (around 1.4 – 1.7 children per woman) and 
the overall level of welfare increases. This clearly illustrates that under hypothetical 
stable conditions, sub-replacement fertility can be optimal if society is willing to 
spend more on each child’s education. 
We will now further expand this analysis, conduct sensitivity studies and, most 
importantly, apply the model to the actual age- and education-structures of selected 
European countries, rather than stable populations. In order to assess the welfare 
impact of different long term patterns of fertility we use a simple population model 
that enables us to calculate education weighted support ratios based on observed 
initial (2010) population structures and survival probabilities as forecasted by the 
United Nations in its 2008 revision of the World Population Prospects (UN 2010). 
Using the IIASA/VID (Vienna Institute of Demography of the Austrian Academy of 
Sciences) data and projections on educational attainment (KC 2010), the population 
is first divided into four education categories: None, primary, secondary and tertiary 
(for the European countries studied, the first category is irrelevant). We then apply 
different weights to these categories, both with regard to the dependency burden due 
to getting education and to differential support that people in working-age groups can 
supply for those not actively taking part in the labor force. This is a somewhat more 
sophisticated and realistic extension of the conventional support ratio where every 
person of working age is assumed to make the same contribution to the support of 
the dependent population. 
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Figure 1. Welfare indictor for stable populations by fraction educated and total fertility 
rate, baseline parameters. 
Since there is overwhelming evidence that in virtually every society the more 
educated, the more productive in economic terms and hence contribute more, this 
effect is captured here in terms of giving them higher weights when calculating the 
numerator of the support ratio.1 In the following figures the specific assumptions 
made are listed in the box on the upper right where ‘ed1_weight’ refers to the weight 
given to working-age people with only primary education (this is usually set to 1.0), 
‘ed2’ refers to those with at least junior secondary and ‘ed3’ to those who have at 
least a completed first-level tertiary education. In all other respects this analysis 
makes the same simplifying assumption as the usual support ratios (that everybody 
of working age who no longer goes to school is in the labor force, there is no 
unemployment, etc). 
As far as the dependents (denominator of the education-weighted support 
ratio) are concerned, retirees get the same weight (here assumed to be 1) but the 
ages of labor market entry and exit are education specific. In other words, 
uneducated and primary educated people are assumed to move from the 
denominator of the support ratio to the numerator after age 15, secondary educated 
after age 18, and tertiary educated follow at the age of 25. We also assume that 
those getting secondary and tertiary education require a higher education input after 
the age of 10. 
                                                 
1
 The specific weights at this stage are rather arbitrarily chosen but as sensitivity analysis shows in the 
following, the optimum does not respond greatly to the choice of these weights. Rather they affect the level of 
the support ratio. 
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Here the assumed values are listed under ‘ed_cost’ where the cost is 1.0 for 
everybody up to age 10. It is then increased to ‘ed2_cost’ for those with secondary 
education up to age 18, and to ‘ed3_cost’ for those going on to study to age 25. 
Education has benefits as well as costs. When retiring from the labor market 
and thus returning to the denominator, the primary educated are assumed to make 
the transition at the age of 57; secondary educated retire at 61; and tertiary educated 
at 65. This tries to roughly resemble the current pattern in some European countries 
(Heckman 2010). However, current trends across the continent strongly suggest 
these ages will increase over the coming decades in response to past and future 
increases in life expectancy. In our baseline case, we do assume therefore that 
every additional year of life is an additional year spent in the workforce.  
Likewise, education also matters when “retiring” from the denominator of our 
support ratio. Following KC (2010) and KC et. al. (2010) we assume that the 
difference in life expectancy between people with primary education and those who 
have completed at least some level of tertiary education on average is of four years. 
The gain in life expectancy from finishing secondary education compared to just 
primary education is of 2 years. For simplicity mortality, as well as the retirement 
ages are assumed to be the same for men and women, but this could easily be 
changed as could all of the other assumptions on weights and transition ages. 
4  Results 
In the context of real populations with non-stable age distributions, the time 
dimension becomes extremely important in this exercise. If the time horizon for 
optimization is only 10 or 20 years, the optimum for increasing the support ratio is 
very different from that of a longer time horizon. In the following figures it was 
assumed that the fertility moves from its current level to the target level (listed on the 
TFR-axis) by 2015 and then remains constant. The standard assumption used here 
for all education trends is the global education trend (GET) scenario, defined as the 
baseline in the IIASA-VID education projections. It assumes a further improving trend 
following the countries that are already more advanced in their educational structure 
with tertiary education assumed to level off at a maximum proportion of 60 percent of 
a cohort. A three-dimensional representation of our baseline results for Finland is 
given in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  Support ratio for global education trend (GET) scenario.  
Baseline for Finland, 2010-2100 
 
It shows that in the first few years of our projections the rate of fertility does not 
matter because the picture is still dominated by its initial conditions. Up until around 
2035, however, it becomes better and better in terms of overall support not to have 
had children over the past 25 years compared to having had at least a few children. 
This is because in our model it takes at least 15 and up to 25 years, in the case of 
tertiary education, before the babies born in 2010 enter the labor force. Until that age 
they are really just a burden for society. After that, having had at least a few children 
is already becoming less burdening since by that time those who were born shortly 
after 2010 and/or who have left school early are already shifting from the 
denominator to the numerator of our support ratio. But since the share of people with 
higher education is constantly rising it takes some time until the additional 
productivity in the numerator exceeds the additional costs in the denominator and so 
when looking at the question of optimal fertility in this way it really takes much longer 
until we reach the threshold year, when past investments in children start making 
economic sense. 
 
 Figure 3 cuts through the ‘support-mountain’ in Figure 2 and shows the 
support-optimizing level of fertility in selected years. Extremely low fertility is optimal 
for all time horizons in which these fewer children do not yet affect the size of the 
labor force but only bring down young age dependency. In this case, not to have 
children is best. Such a policy increases the support ratio, but is of course very short-
sighted because it will begin to starve the economy of workers after 15 years. As can 
be seen in the second half of the century, the pattern of an inverted U-shape 
appears which characterizes all of the graphs for the longer run. This is because 
high rates of fertility never even start making economic sense since at any given 
point in time the bigger education costs from ever bigger future cohorts of children 
will outweigh the gains in productive potential. What is also interesting to note is that 
the curve declines more steeply to the left for cases of extremely low fertility and 
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somewhat slower to the right for cases of high fertility. This arises from the fact that 
with very low fertility the numerator simply converges towards zero, leading to a 
rapid decrease in overall support. Conversely, at high levels of fertility – despite of an 
ever increasing number of dependents – the numerator is still fed with an increasing 
number of young workers as well, slowing the decline in overall support somewhat. 
Of course, this comparison does not say anything about i.e. the environmental 
sustainability of these high fertility scenarios. Note that the box in the lower right 
corner of Figures 3 and 4 indicates the TFR which shows the highest level of our 
welfare indicator, that is, the optimum level of fertility (OLF). 
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Figure 3.  TFR which shows the highest level of our welfare indicator, that is, the 
optimum level of fertility (OLF) Baseline for Finland with lines at 2030 to 2100 
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Figure 4.  Support ratio for global education trend (GET) scenario.  
Baseline for Bulgaria with lines at 2030 to 2100. 
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Figure 5 goes further into detail showing the Total Fertility Rates optimizing support 
in every year up until 2100 for these two countries. And as we shall see, in the GET 
scenario for any year these levels of TFR are well below replacement level fertility. 
Note, however, that in our baseline scenario we are assuming gains in life 
expectancy to translate entirely into gains in working years. This way by 2100 the 
mean retirement age has increased to an astounding 72.4 years by which we are 
lowering the pension burden, causing the OLF to shift downward. As we shall see in 
the sensitivity section, these results change as we assume less or no adaptation of 
the pension age with regard to life expectancy. 
YEAR
TF
R
2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
0
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5
1
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5
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Figure 5.  Optimal TFR for Finland and Bulgaria (GET), individual years 2020-2100. 
 
5  Sensitivity 
But what if the educational system does not, as assumed in the GET scenario, 
continue to expand over the course of the 21st century but rather shows stagnation? 
In our next step, therefore, we are looking at the sensitivity of the education weighted 
support ratio with respect to alternative educational structures of the population. This 
is illustrated for the case of Finland for the baseline scenario where all other weights 
are the same as above. 
The alternative scenario depicted in Figure 5 is the constant enrolment rate 
(CER) scenario. It assumes constant education levels based on 2010 age-specific 
school enrolment rates. The picture clearly shows that more education not only 
brings a higher support ratio (and hence a higher level of per capita material well-
being) but also that the optimal TFR is lower in an educated population than in one 
with lower average education. Again, this arises due to the balance of total education 
costs (which are lower for fewer children at any given level of per capita 
expenditure), increased productivity due to education, and the proportion of 
pensioners at any given point in time.  
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The time frame is important for understanding this effect. Thus, despite the fact that 
bigger cohorts of schoolchildren imply larger cohorts of productive adults in the 
future, they also beget future large cohorts whose education costs will outweigh the 
prospective benefits. At any point in time, the ratio of schoolchildren to productive 
adults remains less favorable under conditions of high fertility. 
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Figure 6.  The effect of alternative education trajectories. Support ratio in 2100.  
 
 But the OLF does not just depend on the education scenario. Figure 6 shows 
its sensitivity to our assumptions about how additional life years will be used in the 
future. One might even question that life expectancy will go up in the future but we 
do not consider this possibility for the moment. Rather, we take a look at what 
happens to our measure of social wellbeing when we keep pension ages constant 
despite of allowing life expectancy to go up (scen1) or assume that only half of the 
gains in life expectancy will be time spent in the numerator of the support ratio, 
whereas the other half is additional time spent in retirement (scen2).  
Again, a smaller share of additional life years spent working not just lowers 
the level of overall support, it also has a strong effect on the OLF. If only half the gain 
in life expectancy becomes a gain in working years then the mean age at retirement 
in 2100 reaches 67.3 years and the OLF would be 1.99. If in the extreme case 
pension ages are entirely inelastic with respect to life expectancy the mean 
retirement age stagnates at around 63 years, making a TFR of 2.32 optimal. Turning 
the rationale around, if fertility cannot easily be stimulated effective pension ages will 
have to increase to maximize welfare. 
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Figure 7.  The effect of alternative assumptions regarding future life expectancy 
gains. 
 
While we have performed large numbers of alternative model calculations, in this 
section we only summarize the findings with respect to the parameters to which the 
model is most sensitive. General changes in the education weights for the numerator 
(ed_weight) and denominator (ed_cost) mostly influence the level of the support ratio 
and have only minor influence on the shape of the curve, i.e., the resulting optimal 
level of fertility. But, as might be expected, the shape of the curve is rather sensitive 
to changes in the pension burden (pension cost) relative to the contribution of 
working-age people. The higher the level of pension payments relative to the 
education-specific carrying capacity of active people, the lower the support ratio 
(level of wellbeing) and the higher the OLF. In other words, under this scenario more 
children are required to expand the workforce in order to pay for a higher welfare 
level of pensioners. 
In conclusion, this brief exercise in education-specific population dynamics 
shows that against widespread expectation it is far from self evident that 
replacement level fertility should be considered optimal. If education is factored in, a 
TFR quite clearly below replacement turns out to be optimal. Only very high pension 
incomes relative to earnings of people in the labor force result in higher optimal 
fertility, but this comes at the cost of much lower levels of overall wellbeing. Having 
said that, our numerical exercise only covers the quantifiable economic burden 
associated with population ageing. If global environmental change is factored in as a 
criterion, then there are likely to be additional forces that would pull optimal fertility to 
yet lower levels. In the next section we discuss the political implications of this 
finding. 
 
11 
 
6  Discussion2 
Many governments in Europe report in international inquiries that they are 
dissatisfied with the current demographic trends in their countries. In Western 
Europe the story has been less dramatic because thanks to migration gains, only 
very few countries are already a decline in population and the public policy concern 
is mostly with respect to the implications of population ageing. Yet, the further one 
goes to the east of the continent, the stronger the publicly expressed concern about 
population size. While the prime minister of Bulgaria calls his country’s ‘demographic 
crisis’ the number one policy priority, the president of Belarus speaks of a national 
‘demographic security crisis’, implying that this may require equally drastic action as 
a security crisis at the military level. Less dramatic in tone but equally urgent in its 
message, the President of the European Commission repeatedly called Europe’s 
demographic trends one of the three main challenges facing Europe, the other two 
being globalization and technological change. 
What do these policy makers have in mind when they refer to demographic 
crises or challenges? In the eastern part of Europe, where most countries (with the 
notable exception of Russia, which received many Russians from other former 
Soviet republics) have experienced significant population declines since the political 
transformation around 1990, the concern seems to be very deeply rooted and 
associated with the fear that the country will lose its population base. Bulgaria, for 
example, had close to 9 million inhabitants in the late 1980s; now (2008) it has only 
7.6 million and is projected by Eurostat (2008) to further shrink to around 6.5 million 
in 2035 and 5.5 million in 2060. 
If fertility in Bulgaria were kept constant over the entire period at the level of 
1.5 which corresponds to the long term optimum when considering education the 
total population size would decrease to 5.6 million in 2050 and to 3.3 million in 2100. 
This loss of significant shares of its entire population, which is also associated with 
very rapid population ageing, is indeed significant, particularly in the context of 
traditional thinking, where more population meant more soldiers and more power, but 
also in view of the fact that throughout human history, population shrinking has 
always been associated with misery and national decline. n the global-level policy 
debate, for decades the notion of ‘population stabilization’ has been the guiding 
principle and the explicit goal of virtually all population-related policies, both within 
the United Nations (UN) system and outside. The international political goal of 
population stabilization corresponds nicely to the UN population projections which 
used to assume that in the longer run, all countries of the world converge in their 
fertility rates to replacement level, resulting (in combination with an assumed 
leveling-off of life expectancy) in a long-term stabilization, i.e., constant size of the 
world population as well as of the population of all individual countries. Such a 
perceived future of population stabilization is likely to please government officials 
who do not want to see their population as either disappearing or exploding long-
term.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Part of this section was published by Wolfgang Lutz as a commentary in the Vienna Yearbook of Population 
Research 2008 (Lutz 2008). 
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Actually IIASA’s most recent probabilistic population projections indicate a probability 
of more than 85 percent that world population will peak during this century and then 
start to decline (Lutz et al. 2008). This is very different from stabilization. The notion 
becomes even more problematic at the level of individual countries. What does the 
goal of population stabilization imply for Bulgaria? Does it call on the government to 
bring the population back up to the 9 million mark of the late 1980s, or keep it 
constant at the current 7.6 million, or stop it from declining below 7.0 million? None 
of these seem to be a realistic goal for Bulgaria. But what would be an appropriate 
population-related goal for a country like Bulgaria? Since this is not obvious, we see 
a great need for coming up with a more useful and more comprehensive policy 
paradigm and goal that includes education as well as the number of people by age 
and sex. 
Human Capital: People are the wealth of nations. But it is not only the 
number of people that counts; it is also the skills, abilities and health 
status of the people that matter. All these aspects viewed together can 
be called the human resources base or human capital in more 
economic language. This broadened view of population also implies 
that political goals should not be defined in terms of population size, 
but rather in terms of human resources available for producing the best 
possible quality of life for all citizens. 
Wolfgang Lutz, in his role as population advisor to the Bulgarian 
Government (Lutz 2008) 
 
 This shift in paradigm, from a focus on only population size to one that aims at 
a balanced development of the population by age and sex as well as their 
capabilities and skills, is not an easy one because for centuries, population size has 
been the primary target of national and international population policies. Throughout 
European history, one view has predominated: It assumed that the bigger a 
kingdom/republic in terms of population, the more powerful this state would be and 
the better it would be for all of its citizens (see Coleman 2006). The rationale behind 
this view has been primarily in military terms: The bigger the population, the more 
potential soldiers and the greater the possibilities to defend, or expand, the national 
territory. But there has been economic reasoning behind this view as well: More 
people imply greater markets with more trade, and higher population density furthers 
the division of labor and technological progress – all things that are considered to be 
conducive for economic growth. In the specific case of Bulgaria, however, the 
accession to the European Union brought a huge increase in the market even under 
conditions of population decline. 
The opposite view that population growth is detrimental to human wellbeing 
also has a long tradition – at least since Malthus ([1798] 1967). Here the reasoning 
has been that the resource base is limited for any national population and that 
population growth which leads to higher population density may in the end surpass 
the carrying capacity of a given territory and hence would lead to lower quality of life 
and even starvation and death. With such reasoning, regions such as the 
Netherlands or England were labeled overpopulated in the 19th century. In reality the 
resource base of these countries was expanded through colonization, but also by 
means of greater international trade. Technological progress has resulted in a much 
higher quality of life combined with higher population density. A modern version of 
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this Malthusian view is reflected in the ‘Limits to Growth’ study by the Club of Rome 
(Meadows et al. 1972) and more recently in the notion of the ‘ecological footprint’ 
that shows how the numbers of people in a country and their consumption have 
ecological consequences far beyond the territory of a given country. There also have 
been many discussions of what the ‘optimal’ population size of a given country would 
be. While this discussion has been inconclusive, the majority of researchers in the 
field have understood that it makes little sense to have this one-dimensional focus on 
absolute population size. What really matters is the change over time and most 
importantly the composition of the population. For this reason the section above 
considered the more meaningful question about optimal fertility and considers 
education in addition to age and sex. 
Demographers tend to study the composition of the population mostly with 
respect to age and sex. Changes in the age structure of a population matter for 
society and the economy in many respects. Most importantly, it is the ratio of 
persons who pay into the social security system to those who withdraw from it. More 
generally, it is the number of people who primarily produce compared to those who 
primarily consume. Significant changes in this ratio can be associated with 
decreases in the wellbeing of the population. In terms of pension systems, the 
expectation is that as the population age structure is bound to become much older, 
with the proportion of the population above age 60 increasing rapidly, there will be 
growing pressure toward one of the following measures: Increasing the mean age of 
retirement, or decreasing the pension benefits, or increasing the individual 
contributions to the system, with the alternative of having a huge deficit in the 
pension fund. Most European countries typically show a combination of these 
responses. But the process of population ageing has only started. Significant future 
ageing is already pre-programmed in the existing population age structure, most 
importantly as a consequence of very low fertility over the last decade. Bulgaria has 
some more time to prepare for the peak of population ageing than most other 
European countries, where fertility already declined steeply during the 1970s, a 
period during which Bulgaria still had fertility rates around replacement level. 
There is little doubt that population ageing will pose many serious challenges 
to European societies and that the more rapidly the proportion of elderly increases in 
a population, the greater the challenge will be. In this sense – at least at the national 
level – population ageing is clearly more relevant than decline in absolute population 
size in terms of potentially diminishing the welfare of individuals. Therefore, should it 
be the goal of a population policy to try to minimize the speed of population ageing? 
It would clearly be a more meaningful goal than trying to attain a certain absolute 
population size because it is more directly related to consequences for the wellbeing 
of the population. But – as we were trying to show – this is not yet the full story. 
Whether a smaller number of young workers actually translate into a decline in total 
production depends not only on the number of workers but also on the productivity of 
these workers. If productivity per worker increased at the same rate as the number of 
workers declined, it would not make any difference for total production (although a 
distributional issue still remains). There are many factors that contribute to the 
growth of productivity, but the most important seems to be human capital, a 
consequence primarily of the education of workers and to some extent of their health 
status and motivation. In other words, the future development in human capital 
formation is a crucial determinant of the question to what extent population ageing 
and decline have negative consequences for the wellbeing of the population. But 
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again, it greatly depends on the skills and capabilities of the additional people 
whether they are to the benefit or detriment of society. 
This focus on human capital is not new in the history of demographic thinking. 
Alfred Sauvy wrote in the context of the miracle of Germany’s economic rise after 
total destruction in 1945 and the fact that it had to absorb five million refugees: 
Why this success, contrary to the forecasts of all 
doctrines…? Because these men without capital 
came with their knowledge, their qualifications. They 
worked and they recreated the capital that was 
lacking, because they included a sufficient number of 
engineers, mechanics, chemists, doctors, 
sociologists, etc. If five million manual workers had 
entered Western Germany instead there would be 
five million unemployed today (Sauvy 1963: 169). 
 
 Despite the demographic prominence of Sauvy, mainstream demography has 
not really incorporated this important line of thinking. Instead such ‘quality 
dimensions’ were considered too difficult to measure and largely left to economists. 
Only the more advanced demographic tools of multi-state population dynamics, 
pioneered at and around IIASA in the 1970s, now allow us to fully and quantitatively 
integrate the educational attainment dimension into formal demography. As the title 
of an article by Lutz, Goujon and Doblhammer ‘Adding Education to Age and Sex’ 
suggests, it seems to be time to more systematically apply the human capital 
approach in standard population analysis and consequently in population policy (Lutz 
et al. 1999). 
The concept of ‘human capital development’ combines the concerns about 
population size with the concerns about the age structure and that of human capital. 
It goes beyond the more traditional population policy paradigm of ‘population 
stabilization’ which has a one-dimensional focus on population size. Population 
stabilization is not a viable policy goal for Bulgaria and for many other countries in 
Europe over the coming decades because further population shrinking and ageing 
are already pre-programmed in the given age distribution. Even in the unlikely case 
that fertility rates increased again up to replacement level, the small cohorts of 
women born over the past one and a half decades indicate fewer potential mothers 
in the future and therefore fewer numbers of babies born. Population balance as a 
policy paradigm, on the other hand, also considers human capital and its distribution 
by age and sex. This does not imply that the three determinants of population size 
and age structure – fertility, mortality and migration – do not matter.  
They continue to be the key drivers of change, but they also must be seen in 
their interactions with education. In the case of migration, for instance, under a 
human capital perspective, it would not only be the numbers of migrants that count, 
but the numbers (by age and sex) times their skills and qualifications. There are 
important interactions between education and fertility (with higher educated women 
having their births later, but also having on average better educated children) and 
mortality (more educated people being in general more healthy) that need to be 
considered in the formulation of policies. 
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Further scientific research (including alternative projections and 
considerations of the criteria of optimal fertility as described above) as well as a 
dialogue among scientists, stakeholder groups, civil society and government is 
necessary to find out what is the best way forward. The input of scientists and, 
particularly, demographers into this process will be crucial. But in order to be useful 
in this process, demographers need to go beyond their traditional focus areas and 
apply their very powerful measurement concepts and tools to fields that also include 
the quality dimension of population (as approximated by human capital). To do this 
we need to stop staring at population size and age structure and start including this 
quality dimension in our models (wherever it is feasible) and try to address broader 
societal concerns such as climate change and national identity. This is both a highly 
demanding and highly important task for the future. 
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